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From the existing studies, it is not clear whether UN interventions have a tangible effect on the 
timing of recurrent civil war. This study assesses the extent to which different types of UN peace 
operations have affected the timing of the recurrence of civil war in the respective host states. I 
examine recurring civil conflicts over the period of 1944-1999, with attention to the effect of UN 
intervention on the timing of civil war recurrence and peace duration between civil wars. I conduct the 
duration study of civil war recurrence. The results demonstrate that UN peacekeeping interventions 
facilitate the duration of peace stability in the aftermath of civil war. 
 






The end of the Cold War has brought a substantial increase in the number of UN 
interventions in civil conflicts. In “An Agenda for Peace,” Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented 
a blueprint for the future UN peacekeeping role emphasizing the importance of “post-conflict 
peace building.” He suggested that the United Nations would “strengthen civil societies in 
troubled states, foster the integration of ethnic groups, support democratic institutions, and 
protect human rights.”  This anticipated role for the United Nations has not always been 
successful. The 1990s was a decade of frequent failures for United Nations peacekeeping 
operations.
1
 Above all, the commitment of UN peacekeepers and the issue of political 
legitimacy were the most notable challenges. In Bosnia, UN peacekeepers stood by as 
Bosnian Serb soldiers killed thousands of people. UN efforts to secure peaceful resolution 
were not very successful because of the parties’ unwillingness to cooperate. In Somalia, a 
complex political situation kept UN operation unhelpful. In Rwanda, UN peacekeepers could 
not stop the Hutus from murdering more than 800,000 Tutsis. Failures at peacekeeping are 
evident in the recurrence of violent conflict. Conflicts in the post-Cold War period have 
tested the UN’s capacities and the failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia led to negative 
assessments about the functions of the UN in academic literature without addressing 
successful operations of the UN.  
After a civil war, it is highly probable to have renewed violence since such a society has a 
high risk of renewed conflict very soon after the conflict has ended. In other words, while the 
end of a civil war sometimes brings durable peace, it often leads to “only a short breathing 
spell until the recurrence of the next violence” (Diehl et al. 1996). For example, peace 
agreements were followed by the dissolution of such peace, including situations in 
Guatemala and Cambodia. This may be due to the fact that settlements of civil wars based on 
                                                          
* I would like to thank to Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis for making their data publicly 
accessible. 
1 There were some successful UN operations, such as Mozambique, Namibia, El Salvador, and East 
Timor among others. 
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mediation are likely to “break down more quickly because segments of power-sharing 
governments retain the capacity for resorting to civil war, making it easy to resume the war” 
(Wagner 1996).
2
 Because the risks of renewed violence are very high in post-conflict years, a 
strategic post peace-building is necessary to consolidate a safe and stable future.   
The long-term impact of UN intervention is not very clear. What factors determine the 
duration of peace and timing of recurrent civil war in post-conflict troubled states is still 
questionable. We do not have a sufficient sense of how exactly peacekeeping operations 
keep the stability of peace. In this paper, I attempt to answer the following questions: Are 
UN operations successful in enhancing the durability of peace? When and how can the UN 
promote a durable peace? Which method of peacekeeping would be efficient to enhance the 
likelihood of post-war peace stability? In order to examine whether UN interventions have a 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
General understanding of what happens after civil war is still lacking. In fact, the 
quantitative proliferation of civil conflict has stimulated a substantial rise in civil war 
research. However, little has been confirmed about what determines the timing of recurrent 
civil war. Quantitative studies of civil war have focused on causes of civil war outbreak or 
termination. What is missing so far in these civil war studies is attention to the effectiveness 
of UN functions on the timing of recurrent civil war. The few contradicting studies (Doyle 
and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell et al. 2001; Dubey 2002; Fortna 2004) do not give us an 
adequate picture of how peacekeeping works on the timing of the recurrence of civil war. 
This is a limitation since civil war is a major challenge faced by the UN since the end of the 
Cold War. Note that peacekeeping operations have become diversified in recent years as they 
faced more challenges. Note as well that the UN has emphasized the importance of post-
conflict peace-building with the end of the Cold War.  
Some case studies address the conditions that affect the successful resolution of civil 
wars. For example, Walter (2001) argues that “third-party enforcement or verification of the 
post-treaty implementation period” is critical for the successful resolution of civil wars. 
Regan (2000) finds that intervention strategy, whether economic, military, or mixed, affects 
the likelihood of intervention success. He claims that military intervention is more effective 
than economic intervention. However, these studies are hindered by lack of empirical 
support. 
In relation to studies of the role of the UN, it has been argued that the United Nations is 
ineffective in solving conflicts, with UN intervention having “no effect on the occurrence, 
timing, or severity of future interstate conflict.” According to Diehl et al. (1996), UN efforts 
are “directed more toward short-term goals such as stopping the fighting.” Those efforts are 
not enough to promote long-term conflict resolution. Long-term resolution of conflict 
                                                          
2 For example, peace is “harder to maintain when war ends in a stalemate or compromise settlements 
than if one side achieves a military victory. Indecisive military outcomes make more uncertainty and 
leave different belligerents capable of resuming the fight” (Fortna 2004) because they are not satisfied 
with the terms of peace. In other words, they still think about the possibility of their side winning in 
the future round of war (Wagner 1996). 




focuses on preventing recurring war. They conclude that UN intervention may be “a 
transitory means to limit the most dangerous crisis” (Diehl et al. 1996). This work gives an 
important implication for states that are at risk for repeated civil conflict.
3
 Most of the work 
on the evaluation of UN intervention has focused on its capability to accomplish “short-term 
goals such as prevention of escalation and conflict abatement (Diehl et al. 1996).”  
Existing empirical works have caused more debates. For example, while there are 
explanations stating that those UN interventions are ineffective, other studies find that UN 
functions are important in managing civil war. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) claim that UN 
peacekeeping plays “an important role in ending the violence and democratization process 
after civil war.” Other scholars (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Fortna 2004) confirm 
that peacekeeping interventions play a positive role in the maintenance of peace after civil 
war. This finding contradicts studies which argue that peacekeeping interventions do not 
contribute to successful conflict resolution (Dubey 2002). From the existing studies, it is not 
clear whether and how UN interventions have a tangible effect on the timing of recurrent 
civil war. The peacekeeping role of the UN remains ambiguous. Existing studies disagree on 
the effects of UN intervention concerning the timing of recurring civil wars. Moreover, few 
studies have systematically examined questions of how to use different intervention 
strategies in an effort to enhance the duration of peace after civil war. I test under which 
conditions UN interventions are likely to produce sustainable peace following such civil war.  
 
 
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
In complicated civil war situation, the success of making peace is difficult to predict. 
Moreover, “most countries, which suffer from a civil war and restore peace, collapse into 
further conflict” (Collier 2000). In many civil wars, warring fractions “return to civil wars 
even after they have signed peace agreements. Civil war peace negotiations frequently fail 
because combatants cannot credibly commit to treaties that produce enormous uncertainty in 
the context of a dangerous implementation period” (Walter 2001).
4
 In this paper, I define 
peace durability as the absence of recurrent war. What can be done to achieve the durability 
of peace in the aftermath of civil war? How can peacekeeping operations be effective in post 
civil war peace durability?  
Walter (2001) argues that “third-party verification is crucial for the stability of peace in 
the aftermath of civil war. For negotiations to succeed it is not enough for the opposing sides 
to resolve the underlying issues behind a civil war. Instead the combatants must have 
credible guarantees on the terms of agreement.” According to Walter, the prospect of third-
party security guarantee is crucial to overcome the commitment problem, through the period 
of demobilization.
5
 The factions cannot commit to adhere to terms of political pact because 
there is nothing to prevent them from defecting once the other side demobilizes. 
                                                          
3 Diehl et al.’s study is inconclusive on the evaluation of UN interventions in the aftermath of civil war. 
4 Walter (2001) finds that signed peace agreements often do not guarantee peace between 1940 and 
1992. 
5 “When groups obtain third-party security guarantees for the treacherous demobilization period that 
follows the signing of an agreement, and obtain power-sharing guarantees in the first postwar 
government, they will implement their settlement. When groups fail to obtain such guarantees, the 
warring factions will reject a negotiated settlement and continue their war.” (Walter 2001) 
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“Combatants in civil wars cannot monitor their own agreements; they need a third party to 
verify that neither side is defecting. Moreover, in civil conflicts it may be hard to tell who 
started it when combatants chose to return to war. Both sides have an incentive to blame the 
other with aggression. UN observers or monitors make it less likely that an aggressor can get 
away with renewing war by claiming that the other side cheated first” (Fortna 2004).  
Even after combatants have reached peace settlements, war might resume through 
enormous uncertainty. Even if neither faction chooses to resume the war, “security dilemmas 
can lead peace to falter.  In this situation, peacekeeping operations are needed to help the 
prevention of the escalation of war. By providing credible information and opportunities, 
they can alleviate mistrust and make aggression more costly. They can also help protect 
against political abuse by one side that excludes the other. Sustaining the stability of peace 
requires a political process. Ending civil war requires the reconstruction of a political 
structure that both factions can accept.  Former combatants will return to war if they feel they 
are losing politically” (Fortna 2004). If a power-sharing pact is not adhered to, if elections 
are manipulated, either side will restart the war. In this process, UN operations can assist 
political reforms that sustain peace. By providing credible information and transparency, 
they can alleviate distrust, and make attacks more costly. UN efforts also provide “the 
transfer of aid and technical expertise, which can reduce hostility and boost domestic 
capacities” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). By doing so, international mission may be helpful in 
rebuilding trust and transparency. To sum up, UN peacekeeping operations to foster third-
party security guarantee are critical to overcoming the commitment problem of warring 
factions. Peacekeeping operations diminish further complications by helping economic 
reconstruction. By doing so, UN operations can sustain the duration of peace after civil war. 
 
Hypothesis: If UN peacekeeping operations are deployed, the duration of peace after a 
civil war will be longer.  
 
As mentioned, it has been debated whether UN peacekeeping operations make a positive 
contribution to the stability of peace. Some scholars (Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel 1996; 
Dixon 1996; Dubey 2002) show that UN peacekeeping missions do not consistently promote 
the success of conflict management. On the other hand, some empirical studies (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Fortna 2004) have found that UN 
peacekeeping operations promote peace in the aftermath of civil wars. In civil conflict 
situations, the United Nations supervises a ceasefire agreement or reinforces a conflict’s 
resolution. The UN intervention signals credible commitment in ending civil conflict and 
establishing sustainable peace. Such peacekeeping operations are important in conflict 
management, and they had become a significant resource for conflict management. In this 
sense, if UN peacekeeping operations are deployed, the duration of peace after a civil war 
will be longer.  
More strategic peacekeeping can make a difference. Monitoring, mediation, 
multidimensional peacekeeping and military enforcement operations may have a different 
effect for durable peace and the timing of recurrent civil war. It is expected that strong 
military operations may stop the violence for a while. Military enforcement missions are 
usually larger. They are capable of offensive action if necessary. Particularly, they do not 
require consent of the factions. Based on these new features, this new mission is called the 
second generation peacekeeping operation. As the characteristics of this mission entail, 
military enforcement mission can be extremely dangerous. Since it cannot secure the 




political support and legitimacy from warring parties often, carrying out its mission becomes 
very difficult.  Perhaps this is why the deployment of this particular mission is rare in the 
first place.
6
 To be effective, UN peacekeepers should have sufficient political support and 
legitimacy. Strong military resources do not guarantee durable peace prospects if they lack 
political legitimacy. On the other hand, consent-based operations may have the political 
support in the first place. However, it may not be effective in stopping violence. 
“Peacekeeping with extensive civilian functions cannot end the violence especially if 
belligerents do not cooperate” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). But it does not mean that 
monitoring, traditional, and multidimensional peacekeeping are always ineffective. They 
may be more efficient in maintaining durable peace prospects with a peace treaty if they have 
sufficient political and financial support.
7
 If peacekeeping operations are deployed, it should 
be effective and strategic. Only appropriate and effective missions with proper 
considerations and case-specific investigations should increase the stability of peace after 
civil war such as in Mozambique and El Salvador.  
The outcomes of the UN interventions in Somalia and Mozambique show conditions 
under which UN operations produce successful results. For instance, in Mozambique, the UN 
Operation was created to observe the suspension of hostilities and the institutionalization of a 
democratic government. The UN operation was successful in providing humanitarian 
assistance, demobilizing the armed forces, and monitoring free and fair election process. 
When a cease-fire is in place, by the time the UN operations are deployed the chances of 
positive results are improved substantially.
8
 However, the UN Operation in Somalia was a 
failure.
9
 These two cases show that different types of UN strategies produce different 
outcomes. In this sense, it is important to use the right strategy. For example, “if there is less 
hostility among factions with a ceasefire agreement, international monitoring may be enough 
in preserving peace” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Traditional peacekeeping operation can 
diminish further complications by helping conciliating different parties. It is also efficient in 
preventing unnecessary external intervention and any spillover of conflict (Diehl et al. 1996; 
                                                          
6 This mission is very expensive as well. 
7 There is no empirical evidence that peacekeepers with extensive civilian functions are “deployed 
where the combatants had signaled their political will for peace by signing a treaty” though (Fortna 
2004). 
8 Peace has not been disturbed for over a decade. The possibility of future militarized conflict between 
Renamo and Frelimo is very low. “While ONUMOZ (The United Nations Operation in Mozambique) 
was not militarily strong enough to deter aggression, its presence changed the incentives facing 
Renamo and Frelimo. Peacekeeping operation made peace more attractive and violation more costly. 
It also allowed these enemies to have some mutual trust in each other, by preventing a security 
dilemma. The UN also constrained Frelimo’s ability to shut Renamo out of the political process and 
helped Renamo transform into a viable political party” (Fortna 2004). 
9 The operations of UN aimed to create a safe security in Somalia. The delivery of humanitarian 
assistance was another goal. Despite the progress, a safe environment had not been established, and 
disorders continued. There was no effective government, no organized civilian police and no 
disciplined national army. The Secretary-General decided to use enforcement mission under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter to establish a secure environment. The new mandate assisted the revival of 
economic and political reconstruction. In 1994, after several violent attacks on UN soldiers, the UN 
revised the mandate of the operation to exclude the use of coercive methods. UNOSOM (The United 
Nations Operation in Somalia) was withdrawn in 1995 without success.  
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Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). Multidimensional peacekeepers with civilian 
functions will be more efficient where the factions had revealed their will for peace by 
signing peace agreements. International military enforcement may be necessary to solve 
cooperation problems by enforcing peace agreements (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). In 
complex civil war situation, it has become difficult to decide how and what kinds of UN 
operations should be used. We cannot simply conclude that the more militarized the 
operation is, the better the chances of peace-building success are. Strategic UN operations 
with balanced political and financial support are needed to build durable peace. Other 
situational factors also come into play. Appropriate strategy can be very significant in 
rebuilding successful self-sustaining peace. 
  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
 
This paper examines the effect of UN intervention on the timing of civil war recurrence 
and the duration of peace between civil wars. Civil war is defined as a conflict in which there 
are “more than 1000 deaths in a single year; It occurs within the recognized boundary of that 
state; It involves the state as a principal combatant; It includes rebels with the ability to 
mount organized armed opposition to the state; It has parties concerned with the prospect of 
living together in the same political unit after the end of the war” (Doyle and Sambanis 
2000).  
The main dependent variable is the time between the end of civil conflict and the start of 
another conflict. The dates of cease fire and recurrent civil war are constructed based on 
Keesing’s Record of World Events and State Failure project. The UN data is adapted from 
the dataset of Doyle and Sambanis (2000). One of the benefits of the data is that they “coded 




There are different types of UN peacekeeping operations. Monitoring is called the first 
generation peacekeeping operation. In the past, monitoring was the traditional job of UN 
peacekeeping operations.  It includes the use of troops to monitor a cease-fire and to support 
structures which will improve peace in order to avoid recurrent war. Recently, peacekeeping 
operations became comprehensive, including conflict prevention, peacemaking, and post-
conflict peace-building. It includes humanitarian assistance and the prevention of conflict 
escalation. It also engages in peacemaking to resolve the issues that caused the conflict. 
Sometimes it attempts to enforce ceasefire agreements.  
Peacekeeping is coded using both dummy variables and by categories of peacekeeping 
missions such as observer mission, traditional peacekeeping (mediation), multidimensional 
peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.
11
 A monitoring mission needs the consent of the host 
government. It monitors an agreement to cease hostilities and help reach a peace treaty with 
observers. Traditional peacekeeping missions establish a buffer zone and help the 
disarmament of military forces. UN operations supervise cease-fires by preventing future 
conflict. They work with the consent of the parties. They are allowed to fire back only in 
self-defense. Traditional peacekeeping operations are made after armed conflicts to ensure 
                                                          
10 Peacekeepers do not just simply choose easy tasks. This is important because peacekeeping studies 
were “guilty of selection bias” (Fortna 2004).  
11 I follow Doyle and Sambanis’s classifications of the four UN operation types. 




agreements are being implemented. Multidimensional peacekeeping facilitates a peace pact. 
It focuses on economic and institutional reconstruction, including the reform of the police, 
army, judicial system, and elections. Peace enforcement is a military intervention. They are 
used when other operations have failed and the UN concludes that coercive military 
intervention is inevitable to deal with aggression. Often, they entail considerable risk to UN 
peacekeepers. “In cases where they are outnumbered in terms of military power, as in the 
former Yugoslav republics, enforcement operation can easily have complications” (Doyle 
and Sambanis 2000). In Somalia, military enforcement intervention was a complete disaster 
as well due to the fact that this mission entailed substantial cost to UN peacekeepers.  
Control variables are ethnic wars, the cost of war, the level of economic development, the 
number of factions, and Cold War. First, the timing of recurrence of conflict can be affected 
if civil wars are ethnic wars. Hostile ethnic wars are more likely to hamper the stability of 
future peace. It is hard to reconcile differences among ethnic factions after the end of civil 
war. Second, it is expected that the stability of peace duration can be different when the 
number of factions is larger. Since there are more complex preferences in this situation, the 
difficulty of cooperation becomes harder (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). Many 
factions also increase the level of further hostility. Third, as the number of deaths increase, 
the consolidation of peace becomes difficult (Werner, 1999; Fortna, 2004).  The greater the 
human cost, the lower is a society’s ability to rebuild in the aftermath of civil war. 
Furthermore, if these costs increase, it is hard to remove the social hostilities to build peace. 
On the other hand, some studies found that war weariness is more likely to create the 
stability of peace (Fortna 2004). Finally, scholars argue that levels of economic development 
may influence the prospects for peace. Higher levels of economic development may diminish 
the possibility of hostility among combatants. In other words, more developed countries may 
have better ways to reconcile the different interests between groups. However, lower levels 
of development lead to further violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 
2000). In this sense, I control the economic development level of countries. The relationship 
between peacekeeping and peace durability can change with the end of the Cold War. 
Peacekeeping operations have evolved as the UN has faced more complex challenges with 
the end of the Cold War (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004). During the 1990s, more 
diversified and comprehensive missions have been deployed in many civil wars. In this sense, 
the impact of Cold War is controlled.   
In this research, I explore the long-term impacts of United Nations intervention on peace 
durability between wars. More importantly, I analyze impacts of different United Nations 
intervention strategy on the timing of recurring civil conflict. Since the data is censored, 
duration analysis is employed. Duration analysis uses maximum likelihood estimation 
techniques to study the length of time between the end of an event and the outbreak of the 
next event. Duration models deal with the dependent variable as whether or not peace fails in 
a time length, given that peace has preserved up to that period. If no war has resumed, the 
duration of peace is considered censored on December 31, 1999.
12
 The other key reason to 
use duration analysis methods is to allow for the possibility of duration dependence in the 
data.  
                                                          
12 An important advantage of duration analysis is that it can be used with censored data even when an 
event does not recur. This analysis adjusts for data by studying the instantaneous likelihood of the 
terminal event such as dispute recurrence at any given point in time, rather than studying the length of 
the entire interval. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
I assess whether the duration stabilities between crises are more likely to be longer in 
countries with the intervention of UN over the 1944-1999 time period. This model estimates 
the effects of independent variables on the duration stabilities in a particular time length. It 
can tell us whether the hazard of resumed war is lower after civil wars when peacekeeping 
operations are employed.  
Looking first at table 1, I explore the proclivity for civil war to recur under conditions of 
UN intervention and its absence. Table 1 shows the bivariate relationship between 
peacekeeping and whether war resumes. Peacekeeping appears to make a difference. The 
results confirm the theoretical expectation that the risk of recurring civil war is decreased in 
the presence of UN involvement. Of the civil wars, there is another conflict between the 
same parties in about 40% of instances when no peacekeeping operations were deployed, and 
in 16% of those with peacekeeping.    
 
Table 1. Bivariate Analysis of Recurring Civil War with and without United Nations 
Intervention 
 
 No UN intervention UN intervention Total 
No Recurrent civil war 51 (59%) 26 (83%) 77 
Recurrent civil war 35 (40%) 5 (16%) 40 
Totals 86 31 117 
Pearson chi2(1) = 6.1130   Pr = 0.013 
 
Second, table 2 shows estimation results of models of recurrent civil war. Table 2 
estimated by CLARIFY (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000) supports the result that when 
there are peacekeeping operations, the possibility of future civil war decreases.
13
 The model 
includes proxies for control variables. The table shows that a higher level of economic 
development decreases the possibility of future war among combatants. As the number of 
death costs increases, the risk of recurrent conflict increases. The relationship is statistically 
significant. Ethnic wars are more likely to lead to resumed civil conflicts. Many factions also 
tend to increase the possibility of future civil war. Ethnic wars and the number of factions are 
not statistically significant. Note that this table demonstrates that if UN intervention is 
employed, the possibility of future civil war decreases. 
Table 3 presents the results of the model
14
, which estimate the duration of stability after 
the end of the civil war. The dependent variable is the time between the termination of civil  
                                                          
13 Here, the dependent variable is whether another war was resumed.   
14 I use strata functions to maximize the model’s robustness. Using strata with variables, observations 
with equal values of the variables are assumed to be in the same stratum.  Stratified estimates (equal 
coefficients across strata but baseline hazard unique to each stratum) are then made. The reason I use 
the strata option is that there is a concern for the different skewed distribution of UN effectiveness by 
year, which can contaminate the result. 


























Log Likelihood 60.1505 
*p < .05 ;  **p < .01 
Robust Standard Errors for Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
conflict and the beginning of another conflict. I use Cox proportional hazards model, in 
which different operations are critically considered. It is not possible to identify the influence 
of specific UN operation types unless we unpack them. In table 3, I examine whether 
different UN functions such as observer operation, traditional peacekeeping (mediation), 
multidimensional peacekeeping operation, and peace enforcement make a difference in 
effectiveness of consolidating peace. 
First, we can identify the consistent significant impact of UN intervention on the duration 
stability until the recurrent war after the end of the civil war. The UN intervention variable is 
significant with a negative coefficient. Note that under the proportional hazards model, a 
positive coefficient means that for changes in the value of covariate x ij, the hazard rate of an 
event occurrence increases. A negative coefficient means that for changes in the value of 
covariate x ij, the risk of an incident occurrence decreases. In this sense, a positive 
coefficient means the covariate is associated with shorter duration times relative to the 
baseline. A negative coefficient implies the covariate is associated with longer duration times 
relative to the baseline. Therefore, if UN peacekeeping operations are employed, the duration 
of peace between civil wars lasts longer. The relationship is statistically significant. In Table 
3, monitoring is associated with a decrease in the risk of war and this effect is statistically 
significant. When monitoring operation is deployed, the duration of peace after the civil war 
lasts longer. Table 3 also shows that UN multidimensional peacekeeping operation has a 
meaningful effect on the hazard of recurrent crises. When multidimensional peacekeeping 
operation is employed, the duration of peace after the civil war lasts longer. The relationship 
is statistically significant. Multidimensional peacekeeping operation with large civilian 
functions monitors elections, trains the police, monitors human rights, and manages the 
country. It also includes economic reconstruction and institutional reform. Some scholars 
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Table 3. Effects on the Duration of Peace by intervention Type Cox Proportional Hazards 
Model 
 






















Ethnic War  
.0115 0.1281 
(-0.3865) (0.3725) 






Log Likelihood -139.6 -143.1 
*p < .05 ;  **p < .01 
Robust Standard Errors for Coefficients in Parentheses 
 
find that the relationship between peacekeeping mission and peace stability changed with the 
end of the Cold War (Fortna 2004). During the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were 
usually small and limited. They monitored a cease-fire signed by the civil war belligerents. 
“Following the Cold War peacekeeping operations have moved beyond traditional 
peacekeeping. They began to take on much larger roles in troubled states. Their new focus is 
to create the conditions under which the peace would last after the UN mission pulled out. In 
most cases the UN mission must reconstruct the state capacity. This means managing the 
armed forces of the various factions, creating a civilian rather than military police force, 
ensuring the proper running of basic services such as schools and sanitation,  monitoring 
elections, and administering institutions that would be useful for the factions to solve their 
disputes peacefully rather than using violence. Because these missions operated on different 
dimensions besides separating combatants and monitoring a cease fire, they are called 
multidimensional peacekeeping missions to distinguish them from traditional peacekeeping.  
Multidimensional peacekeeping missions require a much larger number of civilian personnel 
than that needed for monitoring a truce. Police officers are needed to train the new police 




forces, lawyers are needed to help draft new constitutions, and government administrators 
are needed in constructing rudimentary government institutions. These missions are doing 
much more than just monitoring groups of combatants to make sure that they do not violate 
cease-fires” (Gilligan et al. 2001). These missions change the society that will make its 
factions less likely to return to violent conflict to solve their disputes. Since these societies 
do not have an institutionalized government the UN is serving in that capacity. A 
multidimensional peacekeeping strategy is significant in this sense. In addition, peacekeepers 
can help avoid the unexpected escalation of conflict. They provide credible information that 
diminishes the security dilemma. They can also help protect against political exploitation by 
one side that would exclude the other (Fortna 2004).   
Table 3 also shows that traditional peacekeeping is not significant in enhancing the 
prospects of peace stability. UN enforcement has little effect in peace prospects. It is not 
statistically significant. Control variables such as the level of economic development and the 
cost of war are statistically significant. In other words, a high level of economic development 
facilitates the duration of peace stability. The cost of war decreases the duration of peace 
stability, but is not uniformly significant. Ethnic wars have little effect on recurrent war. To 
sum up, UN involvement strengthens a peaceful duration in the aftermath of civil war. 






UN function in civil wars should be evaluated not only on its short-term capacity to deal 
with threats to international security but also on its long-term capacity to facilitate the 
stability of peace. I examined recurring civil wars with special attention to the effect of UN 
intervention on the duration of civil war recurrence. The results demonstrate that UN 
interventions matter. In other words, UN intervention facilitates the duration of peace 
stability in the aftermath of civil war. UN peacekeeping operations are significant which 
means that the UN interventions diminish the hazard of recurrent crisis.  Results in this study 
also suggest that the effect of UN intervention is different depending on situations. I 
analyzed the different levels of effectiveness of UN operations. Monitoring decreases the risk 
of recurrent wars. Multidimensional peacekeeping diminishes the hazard of recurrent crises. 
These findings differ from the argument that “the UN is able to craft only short-term crisis 
solutions that are easily broken” (Diehl et al. 1996). Other UN operations such as traditional 
peacekeeping and military enforcement operation have little effect on the timing of future 
civil war.  
There is still much work to be done in identifying the UN’s effectiveness in civil war. 
One critical need is well developed theorizing about the relationship between UN 
intervention and the timing of recurrent civil war. Without a solid theoretical background, 
models can be problematic. Quantitative analysis shows us that the stability of peace 
continues longer when peacekeepers are deployed than when belligerents do not have third 
party peacekeeping operations, but it cannot tell us how UN peacekeeping operations have 
this effect.
15
 What remains unclear is how exactly peacekeeping operations function in the 
                                                          
15 Quantitative analysis has some weaknesses in building causal theories of the UN effectiveness in 
post civil war peace durability. 
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prevention of civil war recurrence, particularly for monitoring and multidimensional 
peacekeeping. Estimation results in this study show that multidimensional peacekeeping can 
be more effective than enforcement operation. How does unarmed multidimensional 
peacekeeping operation work in the prevention of civil war recurrence? Through what 
processes do monitoring and multidimensional peacekeeping operations make the stability of 
peace? For this, in-depth case studies will show us how peacekeeping can be an effective 
tool in the prevention of recurrent civil war. Case studies of successful UN efforts that 
facilitated a sustainable peace may uncover when and how the UN can promote the prospect 
of peace. “Case studies of catastrophic UN efforts might show us the ways in which peace 
might fail” (Fortna 2004). They are better able to link causal effects of UN interventions to 
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